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AWARDS FOR
PUBLICATION EXCELLENCE
REGISTRATION FOR THE 2007 
ABV EXAM IS NOW OPEN!
If you or a colleague wants to 
earn the Accredited Business 
V aluation cred en tia l, visit 
bvfls.aicpa.org/M em berships/The+ABV+ 
Examination.htm. Registration for 
the 2007 ABV Exam is now 
open. Appointments to sit for 
the ABV exam will be avail­
able between November 12 
and D ecem ber 15. To help 
you prepare for the exam, the 
AICPA in conjunction with 
various state societies has 
hosted a series o f  review 
courses. The remaining loca­
tions and dates are:
Chicago 1 0 /2 2  & 23
New York 1 0 /2 4  & 25
West Columbia, SC 10 /2 9  &  30
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Ponzi schemes were so named after 
confidence man Charles Ponzi, who 
invented a scheme to profit from for­
eign exchange arbitrage through the 
purchase and redemption of postal 
coupons after World War I. Ponzi 
attracted financial backing for his 
scheme by offering investors enor­
mous retu rns. As he paid early 
investors the high returns they were 
promised, word spread, and Ponzi 
began collecting cash from investors 
at a frenzied  pace. However, the 
postal coupon scheme did not gener­
ate enough profit to pay the returns 
Ponzi promised, and, in fact, he went 
deeper into debt with each transac­
tion . He was able to sustain the 
scheme only by paying returns to ear­
lier investors with cash received from 
later investors. W hen authorities 
began to investigate Ponzi’s business, 
investors becam e spooked, new 
investment funds dried up, and the 
schem e quickly collapsed leaving 
Ponzi unable to repay any o f the 
remaining investors.
This article explores the character­
istics of Ponzi schemes, the signifi­
cance o f Ponzi schem es in bank­
ruptcy cases, and the evidence 
required to prove the existence of a 
Ponzi schem e. Not all failed busi­
nesses are the result of illegitimate 
activity. However, if a failed business 
is a Ponzi scheme, the likelihood of a 
successful recovery action in bank­
ruptcy is vastly improved. Over the 
past three years, we have had the 
opportunity to investigate several 
Ponzi schemes, and in each instance
we were asked to establish both that 
the debtor was indeed operating a 
Ponzi scheme and the first date upon 
which the d e b to r’s op eration s 
became a Ponzi scheme. This can be 
easy to do in instances where the 
debtor’s operation is launched as a 
criminal Ponzi enterprise from the 
beginning. It is more difficult, how­
ever, when the debtor initially oper­
ates a legitimate business, but for rea­
sons o f fin an cia l hardship , the 
business gradually m orphs into a 
criminal enterprise. The bankruptcy 
trustee, once appointed , quickly 
encounters two things: a large body 
of jilted, unsecured creditors clamor­
ing for their money back and few, if 
any, existing assets with which to pay 
them. If the jilted creditors are to be 
paid, the source o f paym ent will 
almost always be the lucky investors 
who actually made m oney in the 
scheme. That is, the trustee must sue 
the “winners” to pay the “losers.”
The remedies available to a trustee 
for this purpose are uniquely power­
ful ones. But they arise only if the 
trustee can show, as a threshold mat­
ter, that the debtor was in fact an 
operating Ponzi scheme. W hether 
the debtor was doing so is thus a sin­
gularly im p o rtant issue. A b r ie f  
description of some of the remedies 
available to a trustee who succeeds in 
carrying this initial burden will suffice 
to show just how important the issue 
is.
First, any d istribu tion  to an 
“investor” above the investor’s initial 
undertaking (that is, any distribution
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in excess of principal) constitutes a 
fraudulent transfer as a matter of 
law. All in terest or o th er “Ponzi 
Profit” payments to investors are 
therefore at risk, regardless of the 
relative guilt or innocence o f the 
individual investors.
Second, the debtor in a Ponzi 
schem e case is presumed to have 
acted with fraudulent intent. Thus, 
any and all payments by the debtor 
to investors, even refunds of invested 
principal, are recoverable by the 
trustee unless the defendant can 
prove both (1) good faith and (2) an 
exchange of reasonable equivalent 
value. The burden of proof is on the 
investor, not on the trustee. Since 
Ponzi schem es often  involve 
unorthodox transactions (for exam­
ple, post-dated checks), good faith is 
typically difficult, if not impossible, 
for the investor to establish. Thus, 
even the investor’s principal is at 
risk.
Third, with respect to preferential 
transfers, the cases generally hold 
that there is no ordinary course of 
business defense in a Ponzi scheme 
case, there being “nothing ordinary” 
about a Ponzi operation. Since Ponzi 
operators tend to pay the greatest 
number of payments and the highest 
paym ent am ounts im m ediately 
b efo re  the op eration  collapses 
(which often corresponds more or 
less to the 90-day p re feren ce  
period), a great proportion of the 
dollars distributed by the Ponzi oper­
ator are recoverable as preferences.
O f course the underlying dynamic 
driving any Ponzi scheme is greed. 
Investors suspend good judgm ent
and overlook basic due diligence in 
the ir eagerness to get in on the 
action . In the Ponzi schem es we 
investigated, investors received prof­
its for short-term investments and did 
not bother to annualize their returns. 
Consequently, investors were desensi­
tized to the ridiculousness of their 
yields. A 6% return over 45 days 
looks like 6%, not the approximate 
50% annualized return.
The key to a good Ponzi scheme 
is to make sure early investors get 
their money back, since the best way 
to p ro lon g  a Ponzi schem e is 
through repeat investors. Effective 
operators overcome skepticism by 
having cash available to retire a ner­
vous in v esto r’s o b lig atio n . An 
investor who promptly receives his or 
her m oney back is often  em bar­
rassed for having doubted the busi­
ness acumen of the operator and 
may overcome this humilitation by 
investing more heavily and telling his 
or her friends about the great oppor­
tunity. The afterm ath o f a Ponzi 
scheme is a little like the remains of 
a nuclear explosion. After the mush­
room cloud dissipates, few, if any, 
assets exist. The short-term winners 
in a Ponzi scheme are the investors 
who get out before the scheme blows 
up and the prom oters who raise 
investors’ funds for a piece of the 
action or a commission but put none 
of their own capital at risk.
The key for a trustee, then, as 
indicated, is to establish that the 
d eb to r’s operation  was indeed a 
Ponzi scheme. This article addresses 
this issue: What proof will suffice to 
establish this critical point?
This is relatively easy to prove in 
instances when the debtor’s opera­
tion is launched as a “pure” Ponzi 
enterprise from the beginning. This 
point was well explained in Merrill v. 
Abbott (In re Independent Clearing 
H ouse Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D.C. 
Utah, 1987):
“The evidence before the Bankruptcy 
Court... showed that the Debtors con­
ducted no business operations, never gen­
erated any profits or earnings, paid all 
monthly disbursements to [investors] 
solely from [investors’]  investments, were 
insolvent from  the moment the firs t  
investment contract was executed, became 
more insolvent with each successive con­
tract, and ran their business as a Ponzi 
scheme.... Thus, it was undisputed that 
the Debtors’ business was conducted as a 
Ponzi scheme.. . . ”
The Court held that to constitute 
“in tern ation al frau d ,” a transfer 
need not be made with intent to hin­
der, delay, or defraud a specific 
transferee. Rather, “The Trustee need 
only show that the transfers were made 
with the intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud an entity to which the Debtor was 
or became indebted on or after the date 
that such transfer occurred.” 77 Bankr. 
860 (emphasis in original).
Since Ponzi schemes must, as a 
matter of scientific necessity, eventu­
ally collapse and leave some credi­
tors unpaid, one can th erefo re  
always infer the necessary intent:
“Indeed no other reasonable inference 
is possible. A Ponzi scheme cannot work 
forever. The investor pool is a limited
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resource and will eventually run dry. The 
perpetrator must know that the scheme 
will eventually collapse as a  result o f the 
inability to attract new investors. The per­
petrator nevertheless makes payments to 
present investors, which, by definition, 
are meant to attract new investors. He 
must know a ll along, from  the very 
nature o f his activities, that the investors 
at the end o f the line will lose their money. 
Knowledge to a substantial certainty con­
stitutes intent within the eyes o f the law. ” 
77 Bankr. at 860.
Ponzi schemes generally have the 
following characteristics:
1. Capital Providers. A Ponzi scheme thrives 
on funds provided by third party 
investors. These could be individu­
als or financial institutions provid­
ing cash in the form of either debt 
or equity. Generally, the distinc­
tion between “debt” and “equity” is 
of little importance because any 
infusion of capital gives rise to an 
equitable obligation by the debtor 
to return it. The return of funds by 
the debtor to the investor is there­
fore arguably the satisfaction of a 
debt, either expressed or implied. 
Distinction between debt or equity 
capital is also unnecessary since 
the profitable business activity 
required to service both forms of 
capital is absent in a Ponzi scheme.
2. Existence of Fraud. Ponzi operators 
invariably make false representa­
tions to their “investors” and do so 
knowingly. That is, the Ponzi oper­
ator will pitch the business as if it 
were legitimate, while knowing 
that new loan proceeds will be 
used to repay earlier lenders not to 
invest in the enterprise pitched to 
the investor. Often, the only busi­
ness being conducted is the raising 
of investor funds. Intent is often 
difficult to prove directly. This 
requires a careful cataloging of the 
number of investors, the amount 
and timing of their investments, 
the legitimate profits (if any) gen­
erated from the debtor’s business 
activities, and the tracing of pay­
m ents from  paym ent sources.
Proving that the debtor knew 
some existing or future creditor 
would go unpaid is much more 
difficult, however, when the debtor 
initially operates a legitimate busi­
ness, encounters financial hard­
ship, and reacts not by closing or 
changing the business, but by bor­
rowing money to keep the busi­
ness afloat. If the debtor does so 
knowing or suspecting that the 
business is not healthy enough to 
retire new debt when it comes due, 
but represents otherwise to the 
new lender, he or she has engaged 
in the same basic deception that 
“pure” Ponzi operators use from 
the beginning. If, when the new 
debt comes due, the debtor pays it 
with yet another new loan, and 
does the same thing again when 
the new loan matures, he or she 
has become as much a Ponzi oper­
ator as Charles Ponzi himself. This 
evidence generally is sufficient to 
enable the trier of fact to infer that 
the Ponzi operator formed the 
requisite criminal intent.
3. High Rates of Return. A Ponzi operator’s 
pitch to investors will typically not 
withstand even the most perfunc­
tory due diligence by the investor. 
The key for the Ponzi operator is 
therefore to get people to invest 
without asking too many ques­
tions. To accom plish this, the 
Ponzi operator will typically do 
two things: First, the operator will 
o ffer extrem ely  high rates o f 
return, and second, actually pay 
such returns to earlier investors. 
This creates a level of temptation 
(the so-called “greed factor”) that 
is exploited to assure a steady 
stream of new investors. A Ponzi 
operation will therefore usually 
involve extremely high rates of 
return over short periods of time 
and at least an initial pool of lucky 
investors who actually rake in 
these high returns. The payment 
of extremely high returns to non- 
traditional lenders is particularly 
probative. It shows that the debtor 
knows, or at least suspects, that he
would not qualify for bank financ­
ing. A willingness to overpay for 
credit shows desperation for new 
loan funds. We have investigated 
Ponzi schemes in which rates of 
return ranged as high as 2,500% 
per annum. No business can sus­
tain even anything close to that 
cost of capital. Any debtor who 
would agree to pay it can be pre­
sumed to understand that there is 
no hope of long-term survival.
4. Increasing Insolvency. A Ponzi scheme, by 
its very nature, becomes increas­
ingly insolvent with each business 
transaction. It does so by the very 
“Ponzi” nature of the operation, 
which involves at its core the pay­
ment of previous loan obligations 
with the proceeds of later ones. 
T he Ponzi sch em e’s ability to 
repay debts is solely contingent 
on raising new funds, which has 
the effect of deepening the insol­
vency. Since both past and cur­
rent obligations entail carrying 
costs (prim arily in terest), the 
enterprise takes on more water 
with each  tran sactio n . I f  this 
“increasing insolvency” can be 
established, the debtor’s intent to 
“hinder, delay, or defraud” its 
creditors is presumed. The most 
difficult part o f a fraud case— 
proving that the debtor acted with 
the requisite intent—is therefore 
presumptively established. The 
importance of this to the trustee’s 
co llec tio n  efforts can n o t be 
overemphasized. The touchstone 
for all Ponzi operations is the con­
cept of “increasing insolvency.” 
The trustee must show that, with 
each new loan transaction, the 
debtor became more insolvent. 
To show this, the trustee might 
create  a ch art that plots the 
d e b to r’s cash receipts and its 
gross recurring obligations. When 
each new loan is incorporated 
into the chart, it will often cause a 
wider and wider separation  
between income and expenses. If 
that sep aration  con tin u es to 
increase, and the trustee can show 
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that the business is not able 
through operations to narrow the 
gap, the first and most basic ele­
ment of a Ponzi scheme will have 
been established.
Not all hopeless businesses, how­
ever, are criminal enterprises. The 
trustee must also show knowledge on 
the debtor’s part that the business 
was becoming increasingly insolvent 
and that the business could not sus­
tain the new debt it incurred or was 
likely to incur in the future. That is, 
intent will be presumed only if the 
trustee can establish knowledge on 
the debtor’s part that its increasing 
insolvency was irreversible, or that its 
debt could not be retired from cash 
generated by operations.
Possibly the best way to show this 
is by tracing new loan proceeds to 
the retirement of pre-existing debt 
(that is, robbing Peter to pay Paul), 
rather than using the funds to invest 
in capital and equipm ent. I f  the 
debtor seeks new loans at the time 
pre-existing debt matures, uses the 
new loan proceeds to pay old debt, 
and becomes increasingly insolvent 
in the process of doing so, the trier of 
fact can infer the requisite knowl­
edge and intent. The facts, taken 
together, reveal (1) knowledge on 
the debtor’s part that its operations 
are not self-sustaining, and (2) a plan 
by the debtor to stay afloat with bor­
rowed funds. While such a debtor 
can, unlike a “pure” Ponzi operator, 
fall back on the “hope springs eter­
nal” defense, a strong and well-orga­
nized set of proofs by the trustee will 
often overwhelm this defense.
The key to establishing the exis­
tence of a Ponzi scheme is to demon­
strate that the only source of repay­
ment to investors is funds from other 
investors. Since no business activity 
exists, an analysis of the cash trans­
ferred  in and out o f the entity 
should be su fficient to show the 
sources and uses of funds. If there is 
business activity, it is important to 
understand the level of such activity 
and to document the volume and 
the inadequate profitability available 
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to service the debt load. There are 
trailing pieces of evidence that can 
support your conclusions on the 
scheme such as computing and doc­
umenting the costs o f capital and 
comparing them to the profit mar­
gins of any business activity. Such 
analysis highlights the ridiculousness 
o f the p rop osition  since Ponzi 
scheme businesses cannot sustain 
the level of profitability required to 
service the costs of invested capital. 
Rarely in Ponzi schemes is money 
invested in machinery, equipment, 
goods, services, or even in alternative 
investment vehicles like stocks and 
bonds. Typically, the only disburse­
m ent activity in the ch eck in g  
account relates to payments to capi­
tal providers in the forms of interest 
or principal reductions on maturing 
obligations. Capital provider A ’s 
m oney is d istributed  to capital 
provider B. The cash coming into 
the entity is from capital providers, 
not customers.
Other evidence that might bear 
on this issue includes:
• Material m isrepresentations by 
the d ebto r to lend ers about 
income, expenses, and prospects
• False or misleading projections
• Increased reliance on nontradi­
tional lenders
• Willingness to offer and pay above 
interest rates
• Failure to reveal losses, or lost 
opportunities, to lenders
• Cooked books
• Bleak audit reports
• Neglect of the business to raise 
funds
• Foolish  spending to give the 
appearance of success
• Preferential treatm ent of select 
lenders
The evidence required to support 
a Ponzi scheme analysis is collected 
through the following steps:
1. Follow the money. How are capi­
tal providers being paid?
2. Analyze the business activity.
a. Are there sales?
b. Are funds generated into the 
com pany from  custom ers or
investors?
C. Is the business profitable?
d. Does the business justify  the 
amount of capital and its cost?
e. Is there a lot of activity in repay­
ing investors? Perhaps more so 
than sales activity?
3. Determine whether the investors’ 
returns are exorbitant. Most legiti­
mate businesses cannot sustain 
levels of profitability required to 
service and retire Ponzi scheme 
capital.
The analysis and documentation 
resulting from these steps will drive 
and support your con clu sio ns 
regarding the nature of the debtor’s 
operations and assist the trustee’s 
efforts in recovering actions. X
Patrick M. O’Keefe, CPA, ABV, BVAL, CTP, 
is managing member of O’Keefe & Associ­
ates. His firm has worked with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Postal Service, 
and Internal Revenue Service in investigat­
ing Ponzi schemes. He can be contacted at 
(2 4 8 ) 5 9 3 -4 8 1 0  or at pokeefe@ okeefe  
andassociates.com. Russell D. Long, CPA, 
ABV, is a senior associate at O’Keefe & 
Associates. Michael S. McElwee, Esq., is a 
partner in the Trial Practice Group at Var­
num, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett. He spe­
cializes in commercial litigation with an 
emphasis on Article 2 of the Uniform Com­
mercial Code (Sales of Goods).
CPA EXPERT RECEIVES 
AWARD FOR EXCELLENCE
For the ninth consecutive year, 
CPA Expert has received an APEX 
Award for Publication Excellence. 
This year’s award was part of the 
19th annual awards program rec­
ognizing excellence in publica­
tions work by professional com­
municators. The APEX Awards 
program is sponsored by Com­
m unications C oncepts, Inc., 
Springfield, VA, which helps pub­
lishing, public relations, and mar­
keting professionals to improve 
publications and com m unica­
tions programs through focused 
services.
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WHAT IS TO BE LEARNED FROM 
CARACCI?
M ark O . D ie tr ic h , C P A / A B V , and Ken neth  W. P a tto n , ASA
The appropriate use of the market 
approach in healthcare industry valu­
ation is one of the most critical issues 
confronting the appraisal industry 
today. Many healthcare industry 
appraisers believe that market data is 
often unreliable or even misleading 
and must be used with abundant cau­
tion. Therefore, they focus primarily 
on the incom e approach. These 
appraisers cite such factors as local 
Medicaid coverage differences, the 
monopsonistic market power of local 
health insurers, the lack of sufficient 
data to determine comparability, and 
regulatory restrictions on the use of 
market data contained in the Stark 
regulations.
Appraisers who believe that the 
m arket approach, along with the 
income approach, should be given 
sig n ifican t w eight focus on the 
im portance o f actual transactions 
and not substituting one’s judgment 
for that of the market. Where both 
groups agree is that use of market 
data in the h ea lth care  industry 
requires sign ificant skill and in- 
depth analysis. In this article two 
leading experts, who have contrast­
ing views on the topic, explore those 
issues in depth.
To illustrate our view­
points, we discuss these 
issues in the context of the 
Fifth C ircuit’s reversal of 
the Tax Court’s opinion in 
C aracci,1 which poses a 
num ber o f questions to 
business valuation profes­
sionals. With respect to the 
valuation issues only, Mark 
Dietrich believes that the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision was
more correct than the Tax Court’s 
decision, while Ken Patton believes 
that the Tax Court’s decision was 
more correct.2 Ken Patton brings 
years o f healthcare industry valua­
tion expertise (although fewer years 
than Mark Dietrich), and more to 
the point, his knowledge of this spe­
cific market through his experience 
valuing other healthcare companies 
in the region during this time.3
THE KEY VALUATION ISSUE AND 
VALUATION EXPERTS
In Caracci, the key valuation issue was 
the value of the assets transferred 
from a not-for-profit entity to a for- 
profit entity.
The valuation expert for the tax­
payers, Sta-Home entities and the 
Caraccis, was Allen D. Hahn, a direc­
tor in Pricew aterhouseC oopers 
Northeast Region Corporation Valu­
ation Consulting Group. The valua­
tion expert for the IRS was Charles 
A. Wilhoite, a managing director of 
Willamette Management Associates 
and the n ation al d irecto r o f its 
health care industry services. In its 
opinion, the Tax Court recognized 
the experience and qualifications of 
the experts.
Figure 1. Sta-Home's Revenues and Expenses 
(199 1 -1 9 9 5 )
Year Revenue Expenses Net Income
1991 $1 1 ,736 ,061 $1 1 ,799 ,721 ($63 ,660)
1992 $18 ,442 ,072 $18 ,414 ,315 $27,757
1993 $2 5 ,162 ,701 $2 5 ,208 ,255 ($45 ,554)
1994 $36,882 ,957 $37,141 ,686 ($258 ,729 )
1995 $44,101 ,849 $44 ,535 ,239 ($433 ,390 )
HISTORY OF STA-HOME
Sta-Home was a collection of entities 
that provided home health care ser­
vices primarily paid for by Medicaid 
to residents o f Mississippi. Reim ­
bursements were limited to the cost 
o f providing the service, which 
apparently precluded the possibility 
of profitability. Sta-Home completed 
a corporate reorganization in 1995, 
which ultimately led to the litigation 
with the IRS.
Sta-Home was approximately 20 
years old at the time of the reorgani­
zation. According to the courts’ deci­
sions, it:
• Had a w ell-established brand 
name.
• Had well-documented intellectual 
capital (manuals, procedures).
• Had a “generally good reputa­
tion.”
• Had a certificate  o f need and 
accreditation by the JCAHO (Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations).
• Was the la rg est p rovid er o f 
home healthcare services in Mis­
sissippi.
For perspective, as shown in Fig­
ure 1, Sta-Home’s scale of operations 
had increased dram atically from  
1991 to 1995. A question immedi­
ately comes to mind: Why would the 
owners grow the business to this 
extent if there were no chance of 
economic success?
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
This case involved the conver­
sion of Mississippi’s largest 
hom e health agency chain, 
Sta-Home, from tax exempt to 
for-profit status in 1995.4 The 
entity had more than $44 mil­
lion in revenues and a loss of 
$433,390 in that year, as well 
as a large share of the Missis­
sippi m arket. Such conver­
sions were com m on at this 
time. They took place against
1 118 TC 379 (2002), rev ’d:. 456 F.3d 444, 98 AFTR2d 2006-5264: (CA-5, 2006).
2 The authors offer no opinion as to any of the legal aspects of this case.
3 Neither of the authors (or their firms) was involved in the case; therefore, they are relying solely on publicly available information.
4 The entities operated under state certificates of need.
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the expectation5 of a prospective pay­
m ent system (P P S )6 rep lacin g  
Medicare’s cost-based system for pay­
ing for home healthcare. The PPS 
was ultimately adopted in the Bal­
anced Budget Act of 1997. It paid 
agencies in 60-day episodes of care 
rather than on the basis o f costs 
incurred. The cost-based system had 
led to the spending o f excessive 
amounts on delivering care. Prior to 
the adoption  o f the PPS, hom e 
health agencies were often acquired 
by hospitals (and there was an active 
market in Mississippi). The hospitals, 
which were already paid by Medicare 
under a PPS, could therefore shift 
costs to the home health agency and 
obtain higher reim bursem ent for 
the same services.
The conversion was audited by 
the IRS, which found that the tax- 
exempt entities had approximately 
$18.5 million in net equity value that 
had been improperly transferred to 
the subsequent owners. The new 
owners maintained that the liabilities 
assumed exceeded the value of the 
assets received. The IRS asserted that 
the net excess benefit of $18.5 mil­
lion triggered excise taxes and penal­
ties of more then $250 million. The 
Tax Court subsequently reduced this 
to $46 million.
TAX COURT OPINION
According to Judge Laro’s opinion, a 
valuation prepared contemporane­
ously with the transaction at the 
insistence of special tax counsel for 
Sta-Home was initially rejected by 
that counsel for failure to conform 
to Revenue Ruling 59-607 and to 
address the existence of intangible 
assets. A second appraisal found that 
the equity value of the entities was 
negative, although the Tax Court 
record  indicates that special tax 
counsel remained concerned about 
the quality of the appraisal.
THE STANDARD OF VALUE
A key issue in the case was the con­
flict between the normalization of 
earnings adjustments available to a 
hypothetical willing buyer and those 
available only to a specific buyer or 
specific class of buyers, and whether 
the latter constituted fair market 
value. The following is quoted from 
the Tax Court’s opinion:
“During 1995, the primary buyers o f 
home health agencies were hospitals, nurs­
ing homes, and other home health agen­
cies. They were able to take advantage o f 
a mechanism known as ‘cost-shifting.'"
Cost shifting was commonly used 
in this time period by hospitals that 
were paid under a PPS. The PPS 
generated a fixed payment so that if 
costs could be transferred to the 
home health agency, additional rev­
enue could be generated with no 
additional cost. The inclusion of this 
attribute by the Tax Court was criti­
cal in the determination of fair mar­
ket value.
The taxpayer’s expert, Hahn, val­
ued the cost gap at $667,000 based 
upon his view that a buyer would 
have a one-year benefit from that 
strategy. The Tax Court disagreed:
“This value is too low. The cost gaps 
were available under the then-current 
reimbursement program. They would cease 
to exist under a PPS. Although there had 
been discussions o f a PPS for several years, 
Congress had passed no such legislation 
at the time o f the transfer, and there is no 
evidence that the prospect o f such legisla­
tion had a negative effect upon the value 
o f home health care agencies. ”
HAHN'S VALUATION APPROACHES
The Tax Court reviewed and cri­
tiqued each expert’s use of the mar­
ket approach. Hahn also relied pri­
marily on an adjusted balance sheet 
methodology (a version of the cost
approach), in which he valued the 
trained workforce and certificate of 
need. Hahn placed considerably less 
reliance on m arket com parables 
because purported  com parables 
were “idiosyncratic” and lacked suffi­
cient detail.
The Tax Court also noted Hahn’s 
testimony that guideline public com­
panies were not appropriate compa­
rables because home health care was 
part o f a broader service mix. In 
effect, there were no “pure-play” 
public companies.
WILHOITE'S VALUATION APPROACHES
Wilhoite relied primarily on the mar­
ket approach utilizing both guide­
line public companies and guideline 
acquisitions. T h e T ax C ourt 
appeared to indicate a clear prefer­
ence for this approach. W ilhoite 
derived revenue pricing multiples 
for MVIC, the use of which was a key 
issue in the Fifth Circuit’s decision.8
The Tax Court discussed the two 
com parable acquired com panies 
deemed most like Sta-Home accord­
ing to W ilhoite. The Court then 
went on to develop its own view of 
the proper multiple.
There was no discussion by the 
Tax Court o f differences in payor 
mix between the purported compa­
rables and Sta-Home, which was 95% 
M edicare-based. T h e cou rt did 
observe that Mississippi had the 
largest per capita spending on home 
health  in the country under the 
Medicare program, but that speaks 
more to volume of services than rate 
per unit of service— and the latter 
drives profits. The court did allude 
to Hahn’s testimony that successful 
home health agencies had non-gov­
ernm ent patients and more prof­
itable lines of business, such as infu­
sion therapy. These are all critical, 
and likely conclusive, differences as 
to comparability. Regardless of these
5 A virtual certainty in the view of co-author Mark Dietrich. The Tax Court stated in its opinion that “Natl. expenditures for home nursing care grew from $3.8 billion in 
1990 to $20.5 billion in 1997,” a circumstance that guaranteed congressional action and always has.
6 A PPS pays for services on the basis of a fee set in advance.
7 1959-1 CB 237.
8 Of particular note is the Service’s expert’s reliance on revenue multiples from out of market transactions and public companies. This is a notoriously bad multiple in the 
view of many healthcare valuation experts and one specifically banned by the later-issued Stark II regulations discussed below.
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concerns about the comparables, the 
Tax Court held that the taxpayers 
owed a crushing amount of excise 
taxes and penalties.
APPELLATE COURT OPINION
The Fifth Circuit severely criticized 
the IRS for its numerous errors in 
the assessment process, Judge Laro 
for engaging in valuation, and Wil­
hoite for his failure to understand 
the Mississippi m arketplace. The 
Fifth Circuit first observed that Sta- 
Home had looked for a hospital 
buyer unsuccessfully. Where Judge 
Laro had been dismissive of the tax­
payer’s expert, Hahn, the Fifth Cir­
cuit embraced him, observing that 
the IRS had also attempted to retain 
him and that he spent eight weeks in 
Mississippi working on the case9 
compared to W ilhoite’s two days. 
Wilhoite’s lack of experience in the 
home healthcare industry in particu­
lar, as opposed to his general valua­
tion experience, was also cited. Sig­
nificantly, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that: “Wilhoite used market-based 
and incom e-based approaches to 
assign values to all Sta-Home’s assets 
in general, without valuing any o f Sta- 
Home’s assets in particular....” (Italics 
added for emphasis).
SYNONOMOUS STANDARD OF VALUE?
Caracci im plicitly raises an issue 
regarding the standard o f value. 
Without question, all of the parties 
believed that “fair market value” was 
applicable. The potential for sale of 
Sta-Home was discussed by the Tax 
Court and even more by the Fifth 
Circuit. Although fair market value is 
generally  considered  to refer to 
hypothetical willing buyers and sell­
ers, it is evident that the very specific 
circumstances o f potential buyers 
were considered.
Wilhoite used a method known as 
“cost shifting” in his analysis. Eco­
nomic profits are created by charg­
ing a portion of the expense base to
another business unit. Cost shifting 
was in frequent use in the region as a 
m eans o f creatin g  value for 
M edicare hom e health  agencies. 
Because cost shifting incorporates 
business synergies, it raises the 
specter that the standard of value 
had really morphed into investment 
value, which is defined in the “Inter­
national Glossary of Business Valua­
tion Terms” as “the value to a partic­
ular investor based on individual 
requirements and expectations.”10 1If 
virtually every market participant has 
the potential to use the cost shifting 
benefits, investm ent value m ight 
effectively become synonymous with 
fair market value.
T h e third  standard o f value, 
in trinsic value, is defined in the 
International Glossary as “the value 
that an investor considers, on the 
basis of an evaluation o f available 
facts, to be the ‘true’ or ‘real’ value 
that will become the market value 
when other investors reach the same 
conclusion.”
Why is intrinsic value important 
in this case? First there was great 
debate about the future o f home 
health care as a business due to the 
implementation of PPS. Market par­
ticipants in the geographical area 
had widely different views. Market 
transactions occurring contempora­
neously and after the valuation date 
indicated that Medicare dependent 
home health agencies had value. 
Taking the opposite position with 
respect to Sta-Home clearly reflected 
a different view of the company’s 
intrinsic prospects.
Second, the valuation of health 
care entities can be very volatile 
based on potential change in reim­
bursement rates. Note carefully the 
use o f the word “p o te n tia l.” 
M edicare changes are often first 
rumored, followed by proposals that 
may not be implemented for a year 
or more, and then the actual imple­
m entation . T he analyst is left to
make key decisions about prospec­
tive economic conditions of a busi­
ness in the face of both great and 
unique uncertainties. Without ques­
tion, actual market transactions can 
differ from an individual analyst’s 
belief about the future. The circum­
stances o f Sta-H om e re flect this 
conundrum. While hindsight may 
give comfort to an analyst’s position, 
appraisers must look at the broader 
m arket and attem pt to reconcile 
actual m arket activity with their 
expectations and the expectations of 
others.
KEY REGULATORY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE
Certain regulatory structures dis­
cussed here were not in place or 
well-understood at the time of the 
Sta-Home conversion. However, they 
are critical to assessing the relevance 
of the Caracci decision to appraisals 
in today’s marketplace.
The following are excerpts from a 
synopsis of the anti-kickback statute 
extracted from an advisory opinion 
of the Office of the Inspector Gen­
eral:
“The anti-kickback statute makes it a 
criminal offense knowingly and willfully 
to offer, pay, solicit, or receive any remu­
neration to induce or reward referrals o f 
items or services payable by a federal 
health care program. See section 1128B(b) 
o f the Act. Where remuneration is paid  
purposefully to induce or reward referrals 
o f items or services paid for by a federal 
health care program, the anti-kickback 
statute is violated. By its terms, the statute 
ascribes criminal liability to parties on 
both sides o f an impermissible ‘kickback’ 
transaction. For purposes o f the anti-kick- 
back statute, ‘remuneration ’ includes the 
transfer o f anything o f value, directly or 
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in 
kind.
A buyer paying a seller for the 
profits associated with the buyer’s 
subsequent provision of new services 
to the seller’s patients may well be
9 These facts do not appear in the Tax Court decision.
10 American Society of Appraisers Business Valuation Standards, Glossary, last revised June 2005. www.appraisers.org.
11 See Office of the Inspector General Advisory Opinion No. 03-12.
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seen as paying a prohibited kickback 
for future referrals, particularly 
when the sellers remain employed by 
or active in the business.12
VALUATION QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE 
CASE
At this point, the authors engage in 
some point-counterpoint by address­
ing valuation questions raised by the 
Tax Court and Fifth Circuit’s deci­
sions.
What is required for market comparability?
Dietrich: Payment mechanisms are 
one of the most fascinating things 
about health care. Most health care 
is covered by private insurance or 
government programs like Medicare 
(as in Sta-Home) or Medicaid. What 
is not widely understood is that the 
level of payment for those services 
varies radically from state to state 
and even market to market. Most 
urban markets are dominated by a 
few health insurers who hold signifi­
cant influence over the fees paid to 
providers. Very few insurers have 
national market coverage, and those 
that do have sig n ifican t m arket 
share in only a few states.13 In order 
to use a guideline public company 
method or a guideline acquisition, 
the analyst would need to look at 
the payor mix for both the guideline 
and the subject and see if they were 
similar. In a poor state like Missis­
sippi, the in su ran ce m arket is 
unlikely to have been  attractive 
because most patients would have 
had Medicaid, which pays the least. 
This would have made the out-of- 
market guideline transactions and 
public companies worthless.
Patton: The payment mechanism 
is clearly one of the most important 
factors in health  care valuation. 
Reimbursement rates and sources 
vary by region and by state or even 
locality. Mississippi is a poor state that 
was experiencing a surge in home 
health  visits, as com pared with
n ational activity. At the tim e, it 
shared these characteristics with the 
nearby states of Alabama, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and portions of Tennessee 
and Kentucky. A market comparison 
to publicly traded companies or indi­
vidual transactions outside the geo­
graphic region would likely be prob­
lem atic. N evertheless, there was 
acquisition activity in the aforemen­
tioned states in Medicare-based agen­
cies, and demand for them was evi­
dent. Mercer Capital had observed 
market pricing in the range of $10 to 
$15 per visit for Medicare-based com­
panies in the region.
Can appraisers differ reasonably about the implications 
o f a foreseeable change?
Dietrich: Perhaps the most important 
issue raised in Caracci is the Tax 
C ou rt’s specific re jectio n  o f the 
impending change to a PPS, which 
was the basis o f H ahn’s position. 
Medicare had been converting vari­
ous healthcare industry sectors from 
cost-based and other reimbursement 
systems to PPS in order to control 
rapidly expanding costs. There was 
no doubt PPS was com ing and, 
therefore, the change was reasonably 
foreseeable on the valuation date.
Patton: Although there was little 
doubt that the change to PPS was 
coming, there was apparently consid­
erable doubt as to the precise timing 
and the implications o f its imple­
mentation. The prevailing tempo­
rary paym ent system (PIP) had 
placed considerable strain on the 
financial resources of Sta-Home and 
other home health care agencies. 
Yet, the company continued to grow 
the base of visits. Does this speak to a 
different view on the implication of 
the ultim ate shift to PPS? O ther 
companies were amassing size under 
a general theory that a well-operated 
company could prosper under PPS. 
Notwithstanding the ultimate wis­
dom of that position (based on a 
subsequent event), companies in the
region were increasing their size in 
the belief that customer accumula­
tion created value.
Does "market data " necessarily apply to the subject 
interest being valued?
Dietrich: Another problem is the con­
flict between the Fifth Circuit’s view 
that Sta-Home had pursued buyers 
unsuccessfully and the Tax Court’s 
ap p arent dism issal o f this. It is 
important to understand that strate­
gic buyers in a market do not need 
to buy every player in that market. 
Generally, they will buy only a suffi­
cien t mass to service the m arket 
area. There are antitrust implica­
tions to owning too much market 
share. If the hospitals in Sta-Home’s 
service area had already acquired 
home health agencies, they would be 
unlikely to acquire another.
Patton: A market for Medicare- 
dependent home health agencies 
clearly existed in the region. Yet, was 
there a market for this specific com­
pany based on conditions in Missis­
sippi? As the geographical market 
shrinks, the analysis moves away 
from hypothetical buyers and sellers 
to a very specific list of each. In this 
case, Sta-Home would be the seller, 
and the list of buyers was thought to 
be very limited. At the same time, 
why was it appropriate to limit the 
list o f likely buyers to Mississippi- 
based entities? An analyst should 
not substitute his or her judgm ent 
for that o f the m arketplace and 
assume his or her analysis considers 
every reasonable type of buyer. In 
many respects, courts in these types 
of cases began to move toward an 
investm ent value standard that 
m ight well be reason ab le  in an 
industry highly influenced by regula­
tions and dominated by a narrow 
payment structure.
When does data become "irrelevant history"? 
D ietrich: H istorical transactions 
would have been increasingly irrele­
12 See, McLeod Regional Medical Center to Pay U.S. Over $15 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations, U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, 11/1/02.
13 See, Government Accounting Office Private Health Insurance: Number and Market Share of Carriers in the Small Group Health Insurance Market.
8
Fall 2007 CPA E xpert
vant measures as the PPS 
loomed ever closer, at least 
to the ex ten t they were 
based on the cost gap. Com­
parability can be a function 
of time. If a major change in 
the reim bu rsem en t p ro­
gram occurs, comparability 
is lost. Therefore, one must 
be able to relate the reim­
bursem ent systems to the 
timing of the transaction.
P atton : My co-au thor 
should be given great credit 
for emphasizing this crucial point. 
The viability of any health care busi­
ness is extremely exposed to the pay­
ment system. To the extent that pay­
ments are made by a government 
entity (Medicare, Medicaid, or local 
tax support), the prospects for that 
business can (and do) change 
greatly as reimbursement changes. 
Home health care literally exploded 
in the early 1990s. It was obvious that 
som e reactio n  from  the U nited  
States governm ent would occur. 
Transactions that occurred during 
the timeframe of growth may not be 
relevant to a specific valuation. The 
underlying conditions are just not 
comparable. Nevertheless, transac­
tions for Medicare-based agencies 
continued to occur within the region 
for several years after 1995 at pre- 
1995 levels. This was apparently due 
to the differences in outlook for the 
industry and the impact of PPS. The 
im portant point is, however, that 
allegedly comparable transactions 
can become dated literally overnight 
as the reimbursement rules change.
What does i t  mean to be reasonably informed o f the 
relevant facts?
Dietrich: Knowledge of impending 
legislative changes in healthcare, 
even if several years in the future, is 
critical to developing a realistic cash 
flow forecast. Many of these changes 
are driven by the recommendation
of the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, established by Con­
gress as part of the Balanced Budget 
Act o f 1997 to advise it about 
needed changes. Equally important, 
extremely rapid growth in revenues 
in a particular industry sub-sector is 
com pelling evidence that future 
growth is likely to be curtailed. For 
example, this happened in the sum­
mer of 2005 with respect to high 
tech im aging after four years o f 
rapid growth, when payments for 
diagnostic exams, such as magnetic 
residence imaging (MRI) and com­
puted tomography (CT) were cur­
tailed and positron emission tomog­
raphy (PET) was brought within the 
purview o f the Stark Laws, which 
govern physician self-referral for 
Medicare and Medicaid patients.
As the present author noted in an 
article ,14 discussing the then just- 
released Tax C ourt’s decision in 
Caracci:
“Moreover, these cost shifting strategies 
have been the subject o f numerous civil 
and crim inal proceedings under the 
Medicare Fraud and Abuse Statute. In 
fact, MedPAC’s current [2002] report15 
notes that:
The new payment system’s [The pay­
ment system was changed from a cost- 
based system to an interim system with 
stricter payment limits in 1997, then 
changed again to the prospective pay­
ment system in October 2000.] 
adjustments to eligibility and  
fraud and abuse reduction efforts 
were intended to reduce spending 
and redirect the benefit toward 
briefer, more intense care. 
Changes in spending and use 
between 1997 and 1999 demon­
strate that these changes had  
some dramatic effects (McCall et 
al. 2001): Total Medicare spend­
ing on home health fell 52 per­
cent. . . ”
Allowing for the inherent distor­
tions in reporting caused by the cost­
shifting strategy used by hospitals 
with respect to home health agen­
cies, Figure 2 presents a graph that 
illustrates the four-year margin, from 
1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 0 , on M edicare hom e 
health business for hospitals (the 
arguably strategic class of acquirer 
that was the basis for the Tax Court 
decision). This shows the decreased 
spending in those years, which 
occurred even though the PPS was 
not finally  im p lem ented  due to 
delays until 2000 . T h e bottom  
dropped out two years before the 
implementation.
What is astounding about the Tax 
Court decision is that this informa­
tion was known at the time of the 
trial; the court either was unaware of 
it or ignored it. The information very 
clearly demonstrates that Hahn was 
correct. The court’s rationale seem­
ingly cannot be that the information 
came after the valuation date as can 
be seen clearly from the following 
statement by the court concerning 
post-valuation date data.16
“Home health agencies rem ained  
under a cost reimbursement system until 
September 30, 1999, when legislation 
passed by Congress in 1997 providing a 
PPS fo r  home health agencies took fu ll 
effect. The H ealth  Care F in a n c ia l  
Administration (HCFA) encountered 
problems implementing the system, and it
14 “Valuation, Tax Exemption, ‘Fair Market Value,’ and The Tax Court (Caracci, et al\. Commissioner)”, Medical Management Advisor, May, 2002.
15 Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2002; see page 93 forward.
16 Later in the opinion, the court stated that Hahn’s inclusion of a one-year “cost gap” should have been a two-year “cost gap,” apparently because the PPS was, in fact, 
passed in 1997, two years after the Sta-Home transaction.
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was not finally implemented until Octo­
ber 1, 2000. ”
The requirement for regional mar­
ket value evidence is now spelled out 
in the Stark Laws. Although imple­
m ented well after the Sta-Hom e 
transaction, abuses in valuing such 
transactions are a principal reason 
for the rule:
“Fair market value means the value 
in arm ’s-length transactions consistent 
with general market value. ‘General mar­
ket value’ means the price that an asset 
would bring as the result o f bona fide bar­
gaining between well-informed buyers 
and sellers who are not otherwise in a 
position to generate business for the other 
party; or the compensation that would be 
included in a service agreement as a 
result o f  bona fid e bargaining between 
well-informed parties to the agreement 
who are not otherwise in a position to 
generate business for the other party, on 
the date o f acquisition or at the time o f the 
service agreement. Usually the fa ir  market 
price is the price at which bona fide sales 
have been consummated for assets o f like 
type, quality, and quantity in a particu­
lar market at the time of acquisition.17
“Moreover, the definition o f fa ir  mar­
ket value’ in the statute and regulation is 
qualified in ways that do not necessarily 
comport with the usage o f  the term in 
standard valuation  techniques and  
methodologies. For example, the methodol­
ogy must exclude valuations where the 
parties to the transactions are at arm ’s 
length but in a position to refer to one 
another. ” 178
The following clarifying statement 
should be included immediately fol­
lowing the standard definition of fair 
market value: Reasonable knowledge o f 
the relevant facts contemplates an under­
standing o f the regulatory environment 
for health care entities.
Patton: It is surely essential to 
understand the legal and regulatory 
structure. Once again, however, mar­
ket data from relevant transactions 
appear to offer a different interpre­
tation of the specific implications of 
the prospective changes in the home 
health care industry. Nevertheless, 
the comments above are extremely 
im portant in understanding the 
rules of valuation in a highly regu­
lated industry such as healthcare.
How does the valuation analyst balance historical results 
with changes in the strategic position o f the industry and 
varying views o f the industry?
Dietrich: The single most powerful 
tool for differentiating “strategic” 
value inherent in acquisition prices 
from fair market value is a disciplined 
application of the income approach 
on a stand-alone basis. If the value 
indications under the m arket 
approach cannot be sustained on a 
stand-alone basis,19 the analyst needs 
to perform an analysis to justify a 
crossover from strategic value to fair 
market value in the marketplace.20 In 
other sectors of the economy, such as 
banking, most, if not all, buyers have 
“strategic” opportunities from things 
such as economies of scale. Because 
the definition of fair market value in 
health care is qualified by the regula­
tory environment, only certain types 
of otherwise strategic adjustments can 
be considered. Each category o f 
“strategic” opportunity must be iden­
tified, evaluated for appropriateness 
under the statutes and regulations, 
and then, if appropriate, included in 
the valuation model (typically a dis­
counted cash flow) to justify the value 
conclusion  under the incom e 
approach. The value indications of 
the different approaches cannot be 
said to have been reconciled absent 
such an undertaking.
For example, it might be appro­
priate to value a subject in a sector 
that is being consolidated on the 
basis of consolidator transactions if 
the consolidators are active in the
subject’s service area. In that case, 
otherwise strategic adjustments such 
as a lower cost o f capital, higher 
growth rates, and lower operating 
costs might be appropriate normal­
ization adjustments in an incom e 
approach.21
At the same tim e, and m ore 
important, it is incumbent on the 
analyst to eliminate the possibility 
that market data may have included 
strategic considerations that violate 
the Stark laws, Anti-kickback Statute, 
or IRS regulations and rulings for 
exempt entities; Caracci, after all, was 
about excise taxes for an excess ben­
efit transaction. In the two opinions, 
it is not clear whether there was testi­
mony about the appropriateness 
from a regulatory standpoint of con­
sidering acquisition multiples based 
on agencies that included infusion 
or respiratory therapy. T h e Tax 
Court made it clear that Hahn, who 
was a leading expert in this area, 
eliminated them (appropriately):
“From these privately held transac­
tions, Hahn excluded sales o f privately 
held home health agencies that provided 
sophisticated ‘infusion or respiratory ther­
apy’ because those could attract reim­
bursement at a higher rate than those 
available to the more traditional home 
health care agencies such as Sta-Home. ”
Patton: An analyst must consider 
the regulatory structure. Once again, 
this is a situation in which many of 
the prospective buyers are likely to 
view acquisition targets from the per­
spective of investment value. Hence, 
fair market value and investment 
value begin to merge.
Can a business that appears to be losing money in 
perpetuity have goodwill, or is there the potential for 
creating value even when there is no direct way to 
create profits?
Dietrich: This question is certainly 
one that often confronts appraisers.
17 420 CFR 411.351 (Emphasis added).
18 Medicare Program; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships (Phase II); Interim Final Rule; 69 Fed. Reg. 16053.
19 Damodoran describes stand-alone value in his writings on evaluating acquisitions. www.stem.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.
20 See Dietrich, “Understanding the Difference Between Strategic and Fair Market Value in Consolidating Industries,” 21 Business Valuation Review 77 (June 2002).
21 Ibid.
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I believe the prevailing view among 
appraisers who limit themselves to 
the healthcare industry is that if one 
cannot generate a cash return, one 
generally cannot have intangible 
value. Because the definition of fair 
market value is constrained by what 
is legally permissible (for example, a 
cocaine dealership has no fair mar­
ket value because it is illegal), one 
cannot ascribe fair market value to 
potential exit strategies from a losing 
business that are inconsistent with 
the law.
Outside this regulatory constraint, 
a business that always loses money 
may have value to a larger entity due 
to econ om ies o f scale or o th er 
arguably strategic opportunities as 
discussed in the preceding section. A 
simple proscribed example would be 
a physician practice that earns the 
physician less than a reasonable 
salary, but generates significant rev­
enues to a hospital through admis­
sions and tests. The practice has a 
large value to the hospital, but the 
hospital cannot pay for that value 
since it violates both the Stark laws 
and the Anti-kickback Statute.
Value may exist on other than a 
stand-alone basis in such a circum­
stance as Sta-Home, but demonstrat­
ing that value to be consistent with 
fair market value is a required and 
significant burden on the appraiser 
and the parties to any transaction.
Patton: The Fifth Circuit places 
great reliance on a strain of thought 
that Sta-Home’s operations could 
not have goodwill because the court 
could not identify a stream of prof­
itability. Consider the following com­
ment by the court:
“For Sta-Home, the overwhelming 
dependence on Medicare reimbursement 
meant that added revenue meant added 
reimbursement costs, which in turn, gen­
erated greater losses.”
Given the growth in revenue of 
276% evident in Figure 1 and the 
strategies of similar companies, why 
didn’t Sta-Home just stop growing if 
the owners really believed that there
was no hope of an economic return?
The Tax Court explained that it 
believed that this apparently illogical 
conclusion made sense: It found that 
Sta-Home had the potential to make 
a profit, which demonstrated that its 
assets had substantial fair market 
value.
There is a disconnect between the 
court’s theory and the behavior of 
the owners o f Sta-Home and the 
owners of other companies in the 
marketplace.
“To operate despite their perennial 
cash-flow problems, their lack o f  prof­
itability, their increasing operating losses, 
and their increasing deficits.
... its patients— would only enable the 
agencies to lose money fo r  the indefinite 
future. ”
Can a business that appears to be 
losing m oney in perpetuity have 
goodwill? Here again, the growth of 
the size of the business could indi­
cate an alternative theory about the 
crea tio n  o f value not linked to 
reported profitability.
Again, th ere  is a d isco n n ect 
between the business strategy of Sta- 
Home (and other similar companies 
in the region) and the observations 
of the Fifth Circuit. Rational people 
stop amassing assets when it continu­
ally increases their losses unless they 
believe that there is an econom ic 
return on some basis in the future.
The Fifth Circuit posits the follow­
ing argum ent that goodwill is 
derived from excess earnings; there­
fore, in this case, there can be no 
goodwill. It states:
“The Tax Court’s mistaken belief that 
Sta-Home’s intangible assets had sub­
stantial fa ir  market value led it to ignore 
its own long-recognized position that 
unprofitable intangible assets do not con­
tribute to fa ir  market value unless those 
assets produce net income or earnings. 
Revenue Ruling 59-60 requires the IRS to 
assign zero value to unprofitable intangi­
ble assets. See Rev. Rule 59-60, 1959-1 
C.B. 237 ( ‘The presence o f goodwill and
its value, therefore, rests upon the excess 
o f net earnings over and above a fa ir  
return on the net tangible assets. ’) ”
Putting aside the Fifth Circuit’s 
legal position, the court’s implicit 
economic position requires discus­
sion. First and foremost, all value is a 
function of future benefits. The past 
may be instructive, but is not deter­
minative of value. The core question 
for any asset or business value is 
“What benefits will it produce in the 
future?”
Most assets and businesses have 
the prospect o f a visible positive 
return in the hands of its current 
owners. Value is most visible when 
net incom e is present. However, 
every valuation analyst has to be 
open to an alternative view of value 
creation that is not apparent until 
the u ltim ate sale o f the assets. 
Appraisers often place virtually all of 
the value in a discounted cash flow 
analysis in the terminal value; there­
fore , in terim  profitability  is not 
essential.
What happens, however, when 
profitability is never likely or even 
expected to occur in the hands of 
the current owner? Can goodwill 
exist? O f course it can, and it does. 
How could this be true? In one sim­
ple scenario, value in excess of cost 
can be created by accumulating a 
custom er base. By se lling  the 
amassed base in bulk, there is value 
to the buyer, which is often a typical 
market participant. The seller real­
izes the value of its efforts to accu­
mulate the customers.
Did the Tax Court and Wilhoite err by basing the 
valuation o f the assets on the market value o f invested 
capital?
Patton: The Tax Court and Wilhoite 
based the value of the assets, includ­
ing the intangible assets, on the mar­
ket value o f invested capital. The 
Fifth Circuit said this was in error, 
and the value of the assets, including 
the in tan gib le  assets, should be 
based on a valuation of the direct 
value of the assets themselves. Was
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the Tax Court in error? From a valu­
ation perspective, the answer is an 
emphatic “no.”
T h e  F ifth  C ircu it favors an 
approach to valuing goodwill by 
valuing the asset directly. Further, it 
seems not to accept the notion that 
the value o f the assets must equal 
the value of the liabilities by refer­
ring to it as an accounting concept. 
This is incorrect. The value of the 
assets will, by definition, from a val­
uation perspective, be the value of 
the total invested capital plus other 
liabilities and non-operating assets. 
Additionally, the concept of direct 
valuation o f goodwill will require 
the use of income methods that ulti­
mately require the determination of 
total invested capital.
Dietrich: Perhaps both courts got 
ahead of their knowledge in writing 
their opinions. The left-hand or 
asset side of the accounting equa­
tion must, o f necessity, equal the 
right-hand or invested capital side.
The Fifth Circuit thought a more 
m ean in g fu l resu lt could  be 
obtained from the left-hand side, 
while the Tax Court believed in the 
invested capital approach inherent 
in use of the guideline methods in 
which individual assets are not val­
ued. It is a useful exercise to allo­
cate value to the assets after making 
a p relim inary  d eterm in atio n  o f 
invested capital, and the present 
author often does so both analyti­
cally and in reports. Identifying the 
am ou nt o f in ta n g ib le  value is 
important in healthcare appraisal 
because this is where the regulatory 
risk is greatest.
LOOKING AHEAD
The opinions of the Tax Court and 
the Fifth C ircuit in Caracci raise 
very interesting questions for busi­
ness valuation professionals. The 
authors have attempted to address 
several of them. While they may not 
agree on every p oin t, hopefully
readers will find their insights help­
ful, and that this article furthers the 
discussion. X
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CPA Expert encourages read­
ers to write letters on issues 
related to business valuation, 
forensic, and litigation services 
and on published artic les . 
Please include your name and 
telephone and fax numbers. 
Send your letters by e-mail to 
wmoran@aicpa.org.
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